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Abstract 
The performance strategies of 5-year-old children required to 
remember information embedded in a meaningful context was 
compared with that of children who were simply told to remember 
the information, or were not told their memory would be assessed. 
Recall was tested either immediately or after a one-hour delay. 
Children in the "embedded" groups employed mnemonic strategies 
more frequently and studied longer before judging learning to be 
complete than children in other groups, but only children tested 
immediately recalled more. One hypothesis for the poor retention 
of children in the "embedded delay" group was that they 
recognized the difficulty of remembering over an extended 
interval; this was tested in Study 2 where no mention was made of 
the retention interval over which children would have to 
remember. Under these conditions, the performance of the 
"embedded delay" and the "embedded immediate" groups was 
equivalent. Overall, children made more effort to learn if they 
were provided with an explicit purpose for learning. 
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The Effect of Task Purpose on the Recall and Study 
Behaviors of Young Children 
One of the most frequently demonstrated findings in the 
developmental memory literature is that as children get older 
they are more likely to use classic mnemonic strategies 
(rehearsal, elaboration) spontaneously to aid their retention 
(Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 
1983; Flavell, 1977). Indeed, the superior performance of older 
individuals on deliberate memory tasks has typically been 
attributed to their "more planful, more strategic, intentional 
behavior" (Wellman, 1977a, p. 86), and the performance of young 
children has been ascribed to their "passive, nonstrategic, and 
nonplanful behavior" (Brown et al., 1983, p. 88). Although the 
relation between mnemonic strategies and memory performance is 
well documented, still relatively little is known about the 
factors that promote the emergence and development of strategic 
behavior, especially in tasks which require the retention and 
recall of unrelated items (Kail, 1984; Naus & Ornstein, 1983). 
One view of strategy development is that the spontaneous use 
of mnemonic skills first emerges in the context of day-to-day 
meaningful events (e.g., remembering the rules of a game, or the 
names of items so they can be bought at the store); that is, 
effortful attempts to remember first emerge in tasks which are 
embedded in familiar everyday contexts (Brown, 1975, 1979; 
Donaldson, 1978; Paris, 1978; Smirnov & Zinchenko, 1969). 
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Often cited in support of this position is research conducted in 
Russia almost 30 years ago (Istomina, 1948/1975). In Istomina's 
task, children between 3- and 6-years-old were either required to 
go to their school store and collect some items for the cook 
(sugar, spoons, etc.), or attempt to remember the same set of 
items for a rote memory test. Two interesting findings emerged 
from Istomina's research; first, she found that children who 
collected items for the cook remembered more than children 
receiving the rote memory test; second, she observed that 
children given the more meaningful task engaged in mnemonic 
strategies spontaneously (e.g., item rehearsal) more frequently 
than children who remembered under rote instructions. 
Unfortunately Istomina made no attempt to document the 
quality or the quantity of strategic activity, nor to relate 
strategies to recall performance directly. Nonetheless, her 
results are intriguing because they suggest that embedding a 
memory task in a meaningful activity not only facilitates the 
spontaneous use of mnemonic strategies, but it may also affect 
the cognitive effort children invest in remembering. 
Two related hypotheses may be advanced to account for the 
more effortful use of mnemonic strategies in Istomina's meaningful 
task. One hypothesis is that the provision of a familiar problem 
with an explicit purpose helped children to coordinate their 
mnemonic activity to fulfill the goal of remembering items for 
the cook (Paris, 1978); that is, it provided a supportive schema 
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(Anderson, 1984) or "scaffold" (Brown & Reeve, in press; Woods, 
& Middleton, 1975), which reduced the cognitive processing load, 
allowing additional cognitive activity to occur. Consistent with 
this position, several studies have shown that young children 
show a propensity to be strategic in situations where the goal of 
the task is clear to the child and the setting familiar (e.g., 
DeLoache, Cassidy, & Brown, 1985; Wellman, Ritter, & Flavell, 
1975). However, these studies have typically used relatively 
simple tasks (e.g., remembering under which cup something is 
hidden, searching for a lost toy), and have also adopted more 
lenient indices of strategy use than those required to facilitate 
rote recall. 
A second hypothesis is that children's knowledge of what it 
means "to collect things for another person" facilitated their 
cognitive processing. A number of researchers have claimed that 
the ability to use mnemonic and metacognitive strategies is 
affected by one's knowledge (Bransford, 1979; Brown et al., 1983; 
Chi, 1978; Chi & Rees, 1983; Lindberg, 1980). Chi (1978), for 
example, has shown that, in contrast to novice adult chess 
players, experienced 10-year-old chess players not only 
reconstructed a legitimate chess game more accurately, but they 
also exhibited superior metacognitive abilities; the meta-
cognitive task required subjects to predict how many chess pieces 
they would be able to replace on a chess board after viewing 
legitimate and illegitimate chess games. When the same subjects 
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performed a digit span task, both recall and metamemory 
performance was correlated with age. Chi's (1978) data, then, 
provides evidence in support of the claim that knowledge 
facilitates recall and metacognitive abilities, independent of 
age (see also Chi & Koeske, 1983). However, because Chi's 
subjects were substantially older than Istomina's sample, it is 
difficult to draw firm conclusions about the emergence of 
mnemonic or metacognitive strategies from these data. 
The problems of assessing young children's metacognitive 
abilities has been the source of recent critical debate (Brown et 
al., 1983; Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Flavell, 1981; Wellman, 
1983), much of which has focussed on the difficulty of 
identifying the circumstances under which one would expect a link 
between metacognition and performance. Brown et al. (1983) 
consider that, in contrast to verbal reports, "on-line" methods 
of assessing metacognitive activity are more likely to provide 
sensitive measures of metacognitive competence. In a similar 
vein, Wellman (1983) has suggested that "effort allocation" 
constitutes a useful measure of metacognitive activity. Both 
Brown et al. and Wellman have argued that the task-related 
deployment of cognitive strategies requires the judicial 
allocation of cognitive effort which, in turn, implies the 
ability to monitor one's cognitive needs. 
Research, which may be interpreted as assessing "effort," 
has provided evidence that the allocation of effort is a 
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sensitive measure of metacognitive competence (Bisanz, Vesonder, 
& Voss, 1978; Brown & Smiley, 1978; Cultice, Somerville, & 
Wellman, 1983; Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970; Masur, 
Mclntyre, & Flavell, 1973; Posnansky, 1978; Pressley, Levin, & 
Ghatala, 1984; Rogoff, Newcombe, & Kagan, 1974; Wellman 1977b). 
There are several relevant themes in this research. First, even 
preschool children are capable of allocating effort appropriately 
in some tasks (Cultice et al., 1983; Wellman, 1977b). Wellman 
(1977b) found that if kindergarten children thought they knew the 
name of an object they would invest more effort in trying to 
remember it's name than if they admitted not knowing an object's 
name. Second, in rote recall experiments, children younger than 
7-years-old appear not to adjust their effort to fit the demands 
of the task (Flavell et al., 1970; Masur et al., 1973; Rogoff et 
al., 1974). Rogoff et al. (1974) have reported that, in contrast 
to older children, 6-year-old's do not adjust their study effort 
as a function of the time they are told they will have to 
remember between study and test. 
Recently, Wellman, Collins, and Gleiberman (1981) have shown 
that even nursery school children report that more effort is 
required to remember items over an extended time interval than 
over a short time interval. Of course, possessing knowledge does 
not mean it will be used. Nevertheless, the work of Wellman and 
his colleagues suggests that in some circumstances young children 
are capable of adjusting their effort to meet task requirements. 
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The aim of the present study was to evaluate the claim that 
the deliberate use of mnemonic and metacognitive skills, as 
indexed by time spent studying, emerges in the context of 
meaningful activities. Five-year-olds watched a simple science 
demonstration, following which they were given a set of pictures 
to study and were told either to remember the names of the 
depicted items for a memory test, or to learn the names of the 
items because they were needed for a second science 
demonstration. All strategic activity was noted along with the 
amount of time children spent studying before indicating they had 
finished learning. Further, children were tested either 
immediately or after a delay to see whether degree of strategic 
activity, or study effort, as indexed by the time spent learning, 
was affected by delay interval. If Istomina's claims are correct 
children who believe they are studying items needed for a science 
demonstration should not only remember more items, but should 
also use mnemonic strategies more frequently and study longer 
before judging learning to be complete. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects. Ninety-six 5-year-old children who attended a 
kindergarten class in one of three parochial elementary schools 
in a medium-sized city, served as subjects. An approximately 
equal number of boys and girls participated, and the overall mean 
age of the children was 5 years 9 months. 
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Materials. In the science demonstration the following 
materials were used: (a) a box of matches; (b) a piece of paper; 
(c) a narrow neck bottle; and (d) a shelled hard-boiled egg. 
The memory materials comprised a set of 10 2 x 2 inch colored 
picture cards, each depicting a single object. The cards 
illustrated the following objects: a knife, a cup, a book, a 
candle, a pencil, a piece of string, a watch, an apple, a 
small cardboard box, and a rubber band. 
Design, The design was a 3 (Memory Condition: Embedded, 
Rote, or Incidental) x 2 (Delay Interval between learning and 
test: None, or 1 Hour) factorial. Sixteen children were assigned 
randomly to each of the 6 conditions. 
Procedure. All children were tested individually. On 
arrival at the testing location children were asked if they would 
like to see a "science experiment." This involved setting alight 
the piece of paper, dropping the lighted paper into the bottle, 
and quickly placing the shelled boiled egg on the neck of the 
bottle. The vacuum created in the bottle by the lighted paper 
exhausting the oxygen, resulted in the egg being "sucked" into 
the bottle. 
Following the science demonstration, children were randomly 
allocated to one of three memory groups; half the children in 
each group had their memory tested immediately, and the remaining 
children were tested after a delay of one hour. The embedded 
memory groups were told they would be collecting material from 
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the school store for a second science demonstration» The rote 
memory groups were told they would have to learn for a memory 
test. The incidental memory control groups were asked to look at 
the pictures, and after they had examined them all very care-
fully, to tell the experimenter whether they thought they had 
seen any of the pictures anywhere before. 
The incidental memory group was included as a control to see 
whether subject's behavior in this group differed from the 
behavior of children in the intentional memory groups. Wellman 
(1977a) has pointed out that young children sometimes engage in 
strategy-like behavior when they are instructed to simply look at 
material, and this type of behavior should not be regarded as 
intentional strategic activity. 
With the exception of the incidental memory groups, all 
subjects were told that their memory would be examined either 
immediately or at recess (a 1 hour delay) prior to being given 
the picture cards to study. Children were given the picture 
cards to study for 2 minutes, and their study behaviors were 
videotaped over this period. If a child claimed to have learned 
the names of the pictures sufficiently well prior to the elapse 
of 2 minutes, or were distracted for 20 seconds continuously, 
they were encouraged to continue studying the pictures. 
Following the study period, children were either sent to the 
school store to be tested or sent back to their classroom and 
asked to return to the store at recess. Children in the 
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incidental memory groups were asked to go to the school store, 
but were not given a reason for the request. At the time of 
test, when children recalled the name of an object, they were 
given that object. All children actually saw a second science 
experiment. 
t 
Dependent measures and interrater agreement. In addition to 
children's recall performance, both learning time and strategy-
use were assessed. Learning time was determined by measuring the 
interval from task presentation until the child was either 
distracted for 20 seconds continuously or indicated he/she had 
learned the items sufficiently well and was ready to leave. 
Strategic activity was scored from the videotapes every 10 
seconds by two separate raters for the entire 2 minute study 
period (raters agreed 92% of the time, and rating differences 
were resolved through discussion). The "strategy activity" 
categories were based primarily on those developed by Moely, 
Olson, Halwes, and Flavell (1969) (self-testing, grouping 
pictures, verbalizing or naming pictures, counting, and being 
distracted), although it was necessary to include an additional 
category of "looking" at the pictures. For the purposes of 
analyses, self-testing, grouping pictures, and verbalizing or 
naming the pictures were designated "active strategies" as these 
represent classic mnemonic strategies associated with active 
attempts to remember. 
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Results 
Separate univariate analyses of variance were used to 
examine the three dependent measures, and the results of each 
analysis will be reported in turn. 
Recall. The number of items correctly recalled at the 
school store varied as a function of both the memory group to 
which children belonged, F(2,90) = 52.53, £ < .0001; and of the 
length time they had to remember items, F(l,90) = 13.54, £ < 
.001. (Mean recall: Embedded groups = 6.06; Rote groups = 3.56; 
Incidental groups = 2.21; All Immediate test groups = 4.52; All 
Delay test groups = 3.38—see Table 1). The interaction between 
memory group and retention interval was also statistically 
significant, £(2,90) = 5.64, £ < .0005. 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
Follow-up analyses using the Bonferroni procedure, suggest 
that the observed interaction is due to the significantly poorer 
recall of children in the embedded delay group compared with 
children in the embedded immediate group (means = 4.74 vs. 7.38 
items recalled £ < .0001). Although recall declined in the rote 
and in the incidental memory delay groups relative to the 
respective immediate recall groups, the decline was not 
statistically significant. These data, then, provide some 
support for the view that memory is enhanced by embedding the 
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memory task in a meaningful context. Unfortunately, this claim 
appears to be true only for the embedded immediate group, since 
children in the embedded delay group did not recall more items 
than children in the rote delay group. As will be seen from the 
analyses of the other dependent measures, it seems unlikely that 
the poor performance of children in the embedded delay group was 
due solely to forgetting. 
Study time. The only factor that affected the length of 
time picture cards were studied prior to "learning being judged as 
complete," was the memory group to which children belonged (mean 
study time: Embedded groups = 65 sees; Rote groups = 40 sees; 
Incidental groups = 32 sees: £(2,90) = 37.78, _p< .0001). Table 
2 shows the mean study times for the six groups. Neither 
retention interval, nor the interaction between memory group and 
retention interval affected study time. These data provide 
support for the claim that more effort is expended in learning 
when information is embedded in a meaningful context. However, 
although there was a trend for children in the intentional delay 
groups to study longer than children in the intentional immediate 
groups, the difference was not statistically significant. 
The "learning being complete" measure was defined in one of 
two ways; either children said they had finished, or they were 
distracted for 20 seconds continously. Thirty-four percent, 41%, 
and 63% of the embedded, rote, and incidental groups respectively 
were assessed as having "completed learning" because of being 
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distracted for 20 seconds continously. The correlation between 
the measure of "learning time" and recall was not assessed 
because all subjects were required to study for 2 minutes. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
Strategies. The distribution of strategic activity as a 
function of memory group and retention interval is reported in 
Table 3. The occurrence of active strategy use (self-testing, 
grouping of pictures, and verbalizing) was assessed every 10 
seconds and summed for the 2 minute study period; that is, if a 
child used one of these strategies in a 10 second interval, he or 
she was given a score of 1, and could obtain a maximum score of 
12. Analysis of the strategy data showed that memory group 
membership was the only factor affecting the frequency of active 
strategy use (mean frequency of active strategy use over 2 minute 
study period: Embedded groups = 5.84; Rote groups = 3.84; 
Incidental groups - 2.22; £(2,90) = 70.30, £ < .0001). This 
means that on almost 50% of the occasions assessed, the average 
"embedded" group child used at least one active strategy. 
Neither the length of time children had to wait before being 
tested, nor the interaction between memory group membership and 
retention interval affected frequency of active strategy use. 
Follow-up analyses using the Bonferroni procedure showed that the 
embedded groups exhibited more active strategy use than the rote 
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groups who, in turn, exhibited more active strategy use than the 
incidental groups (j> < .05 for all comparisons). The pattern of 
these data are consistent with those observed for the study time 
data; children in the embedded groups appeared to engage in more 
effortful attempts to remember. 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
Discussion of Experiment _1. 
The results of Experiment 1 provide tentative support for 
the hypothesis that the deliberate use of mnemonic and 
metacognitive strategies first emerge in the context of everyday 
activities. Children in the embedded groups studied longer 
before judging learning to be complete, and engaged in more 
active strategy use than children in other groups. Unfortunately, 
the enhanced strategic effort did not translate into elevated 
recall for the embedded delay group. This puzzling finding 
could, of course, be due to forgetting associated with the 
extented retention interval. However, several pieces of evidence 
caution against accepting such a conclusion. 
With the exception of the embedded delay group, the 
correlations between active strategy use and recall for all other 
groups was around ,5 (range ,44 to ,64); it was ,02 for the 
embedded delay group. These data suggest that some additional 
factor was influencing the recall of the embedded delay group, A 
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review of the videotapes of childrens1 study behaviors suggested 
a plausible hypothesis. In contrast to children in the rote 
delay group, those in the embedded delay group seemed more aware 
of the difficulty of remembering over an extended retention 
interval, and this may have affected their recall. For example, 
in comparsion to children in other groups, children in the 
embedded delay group appeared to complain that they could not 
remember until recess and often appeared uncomfortable or anxious 
in the task; that is, it appeared that the perception of task 
difficulty disrupted effective cognitive processing. These 
impressions were investigated by reexamining the videotapes of 
all subjects for overt (verbal and non-verbal) signs of concern 
in the study period. 
The procedure for assessing the occurrence of concern was 
identical to that used to assess the frequency of active strategy 
use (i.e., presence or absence of concern was assessed every 
10 seconds, and summed over the 2 minute study period—different 
raters scored the concern and the strategy data). The raters, 
who were blind to the experimental treatments, were instructed to 
adopt a working definition of concern and note if a child 
appeared to be fearful, worried, tense, or voiced negative 
feelings in any 10 second study period. Raters only agreed 66% 
of the time, and disagreement was resolved through discussion. 
The mean frequency of concern as a function of memory group 
membership and retention interval is shown in Table 4. Analysis 
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of these data showed that memory group membership affected 
concern, £(2,90) = 5.18, £ < .008; but the interval over which 
children had to remember items did not, £(1,90) <1. However, 
memory group membership and retention interval did interact in 
affecting level of concern £(2,90) = 3.29, £ <.05. Follow-up 
analyses using the Bonferroni procedure, show that this 
interaction was due to the higher frequency of concern in the 
embedded delay group (£ <.05 for all comparisons). However, the 
low frequency of concern (see Table 4), and the relatively poor 
interrater agreement as to what constitutes concern caution 
against a strong interpretation of these data. 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
In Experiment 1, children in the intentional memory groups 
knew exactly how long they would have to remember test items 
prior to receiving the picture cards. If, as proposed, knowledge 
of the extended retention interval affected the recall of 
children in the embedded delay group, omitting mention of the 
interval over which children would have to remember should both 
eliminate the concern factor which, in turn, should lead to 
elevated recall. This proposal was examined in Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty-six 5-year-old children, drawn from the 
same population source as used in Experiment 1, served as 
subjects. The sample comprised 30 boys and 26 girls, and the 
overall mean age of the children was 5 years 6 months. 
Materials and procedure. The same set of materials and 
procedures used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2 with 
one exception—children were not told how long they would have to 
remember the memory items. All children were told they would 
have to go to the school store to be tested; however, they were 
also informed that the experimenter had misplaced the key to the 
store. Children were told to return to their classroom, and the 
experimenter would fetch them when she found the key. The 
experimenter either fetched the child immediately, or after a 1 
hour interval. 
Design. The design was a 2 (Memory Condition: Embedded or 
Rote) x 2 (Delay interval between learning and test: None or 1 
Hour) factorial. Fourteen children were assigned randomly to 
each of the 4 independent conditions. 
Results 
Recall. The mean recall performance for the four groups are 
presented in Table 1. Analysis of these data showed that 
children in the embedded groups recalled more than children in 
the rote groups, £(1,52) = 54.71, £ <.0001. There was also a 
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marginally significant tendency for children to recall more when 
tested immediately than after a retention interval, £(1,52) = 
4.41, .04 > £ < .05. However, the interaction between memory 
group membership and retention interval was not significant (£ < 
1), Follow-up analyses using the Bonferroni procedure failed to 
reveal a significant decline in delayed recall as compared to 
immediate recall for either the embedded or the rote memory 
groups (jd > .05). Nevertheless, all other comparisons between 
the embedded and the rote groups were statistically significant 
(jp < .05). The improved performance of the embedded delay group 
in Experiment 2, provides support for the view that the poor 
recall of the embedded delay group in Experiment 1 was associate 
with their perception of the difficulty of remembering over an 
extended retention interval. 
Study time. The average time each group spent studying 
before judging learning to be complete or before being distracted 
for 20 seconds continuously, is reported in Table 2. Analysis of 
the study time data showed that children in the embedded groups 
spent more time studying than children in the rote groups, 
£(1,52) = 8.21, £ < .007 (mean study time: Embedded groups = 57 
seconds; Rote groups = 42 seconds). However, no retention 
interval effect was observed, nor was there an interaction 
* K ^ 
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between memory group membership and retention interval (£fs < 1). 
These null results are not surprizing since children were treated 
identically in the immediate and the delay test conditions, prior 
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to recall. Overall, the study time findings are consistent with 
those found in Experiment 1• 
Active strategy use. The distribution of strategic activity 
as a function of memory group membership and of retention 
interval is reported in Table 5. The analysis of these data 
showed that the embedded groups (M = 5.2) engaged in active 
strategy use more frequently than children in the rote groups (M 
= 3.2), £(1,52) = 23.14, p < -0001. There was no effect 
due to retention interval, nor was there an interaction between 
memory group membership and retention interval (£'s < 1). These 
results replicate those found in Experiment 1. 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
Concern. The average frequency of concern for the four 
groups is reported in Table 4. No statistically significant 
effects emerged from an analysis of the data. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, omitting mention of the retention interval over 
which children would have to remember appeared to have minimized 
children's concern. Finally, the correlations between active 
strategy use and recall were about .5 for all groups, including 
the embedded delay group (range .50 to .62). 
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General Discussion 
The present research was designed to determine whether study 
behaviors and, by implication, recall performance, is affected by 
embedding a memory task in a meaningful context. In the first 
experiment, children who attempted to learn the names of ten 
objects required for a science experiment, studied longer and 
used active strategies more often than children who were merely 
told to learn the pictures for a memory test. Although children 
in the embedded memory groups exhibited memory-relevant study 
behaviors more frequently, this did not necessarily lead to 
superior recall; improved retention occurred only if memory was 
tested immediately, but not if tested after a delay. It was 
hypothesized that the relatively poor recall of the embedded 
delay group was due to their perception of the difficulty 
involved in remembering the items for one hour. This possibility 
was investigated in a second experiment in which children were 
not told how long they would have to remember. Under these 
conditions, the performance of the embedded delay and the 
embedded immediate groups was equivalent. These data were 
interpreted as evidence that the poor recall performance of the 
children in the embedded delay group in Experiment 1 was due to 
their perception of the difficulty of remembering for an extended 
time period. 
Overall, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the deliberate use of strategic behaviors to aid retention are 
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facilitated by meaningful, supportive contexts. Further, the 
finding that children in the embedded groups always studied 
longer than children in other memory groups before judging 
learning to be complete, supports the view that young children 
are capable of monitoring their own memory needs and adjusting 
their study behaviors accordingly (Brown et al., 1983; Wellman, 
1983). Thus, these data show that, in contrast to the behaviors 
exhibited in classical memory tests, when a memory task is 
embedded in a supportive meaningful context, young children not 
only make more effort to learn, but they also use superior 
learning techniques. 
However, independent of memory group membership, most 
children appeared to use some "active" strategies, suggesting 
they were deliberately attempting to remember the names of the 
objects. Some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the 
meaning of this finding because, as Wellman (1977a) pointed out, 
children sometimes engage in strategy-like behaviors when 
instructed to look at stimuli. For some categories of strategic 
activity, such as "naming," Wellman's point is well taken; it is 
difficult to determine whether "naming" reflects a deliberate 
attempt to remember, or the spontaneous labelling of objects. 
From an inspection of Tables 3 and 5, however, it is clear that 
children in the intentional memory groups not only engaged in 
"naming" more often than children in the incidental groups, but 
were also observed to use mnemonic behaviors not recorded in the 
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incidental groups (e.g., self testing, grouping of pictures). 
These data provide evidence that 5-year-old children do engage in 
deliberate attempts to remember in intentional memory tasks, but 
that the allocation of strategic effort is dependent on the 
nature of the task context. 
The relatively constant relation between recall and strategy 
use (about .50 in both experiments) is consistent with a "levels 
of processing" view of memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Naus & 
Halasz, 1979), in which it is argued that retention is less a 
function of the intent to remember than the type of cognitive 
processes engaged in. Of course, intention can guide one's 
metacognitive activity in helping select task-appropriate 
strategies (Brown et al., 1983; Flavell, 1981; Schmidt & Paris, 
1984). However, the relation between mnemonic activity and 
recall is not always direct; the recall performance of the 
embedded delay group in Experiment 1 suggests that other factors 
may intervene and affect performance. 
What are these other factors, and how might they affect 
performance? In order to consider possible answers to these 
* 
questions, it may help to refocus on the function of familiar 
meaningful tasks for young children. In contrast to the typical 
memory test, meaningful task contexts may provide support for 
cognitive operations in at least one of three ways (Reeve, 1985). 
First, individuals are more likely to be knowledgeable about such 
tasks which, in turn, is likely to enhance cognitive processing 
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(Chi, 1981). Second, the goal or purpose of the task is clear, 
and this is also likely to foster cognitive activity (Paris, 
1978). Thus, familiar tasks are likely to provide a schema or a 
scaffold for cognitive processing, in contrast to classic memory 
tests where individuals have to construct the scaffold for 
themselves. Third, meaningful tasks often include a motivational 
and affective components which may effect performance 
significantly (Paris & Cross, 1983). Although several recent 
models of metacognition have included affective components (Brown 
et al., 1983; Flavell, 1981; Wellman, 1983), their role in 
problem solving has yet to be explained. 
The above discussion lends itself to a possible 
interpretation of the performance of the embedded delay group in 
Experiment 1. Telling children they were learning names of 
objects needed for a second science experiment fulfilled its 
objective, in that it elevated both strategy use and study 
effort. However, as Mischel (1981) has observed, young children 
often engage in incompatible behaviors in contexts where "delay 
of gratification" is involved. In Experiment 1 it appeared that 
i 
children in the embedded delay group engaged in two conflicting 
behaviors: they invested effort in remembering and also worried 
about forgetting, not only in the study period, but also probably 
in the retention interval itself. Thus fear of forgetting 
interfered with the effectiveness of strategic processing. 
Memory Development 
25 
However, this interpretation, as such, does not explain why 
children in the rote delay group did not suffer from similar 
"cognitive interference." Several factors already alluded to may 
help to explain the differences in behavior between the groups. 
First, in contrast to the rote groups, for the embedded groups 
the purpose of remembering the objects was clear, providing 
children with a scaffold for thinking about the task. Under 
these conditions it is possible that young children were more 
sensitive to their own competence which, in turn, may have led 
the embedded delay group to worry about the difficulty of 
remembering over an extended interval. 
Of course, the motivation to see a second science experiment 
may have had the same effect; that is, motivation might have 
heightened children's sensitivity to the difficulties associated 
with remembering. A related possibility is that children in the 
embedded delay groups were more "concerned" because they were 
aware of the social consequences of forgetting since they were 
collecting objects for another person for a definite event (a 
second science experiment). 
In conclusion, the research reported in this paper examined 
the effect of task context of the recall and study techniques of 
young elementary school children. Five-year-old children can use 
task-appropriate strategies if the memory task is embedded in a 
purposeful, motivating activity. This finding is consistent with 
the claims made for Istomina's (1948/1975) research. However, an 
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increase in strategic effort did not always translate into 
increased recall, particularly when children had to remember over 
an extended retention interval. Awareness of one's own 
competence, facilitated by performing a motivating task, may also 
give rise to doubts about one's competence which, in turn, can 
affect performance negatively. Although the interdependencies 
of metacognition, motivation, and affect are at the heart of 
cognitive development (Paris & Cross, 1983; Reeve & Brown, 1985), 
it is clear that more attention needs to be paid to how these 
factors interact with one another in affecting performance. 
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Table 1 
Mean Recall Scores 
Memory Group 
Retention Embedded Rote Incidental 
Interval M SD M SD M SD 
Experiment la 
Immediate 7.38 (1.5) 3.80 (1.3) 2.44 (1.3) 
Delay 4.80 (2.1) 3.38 (1.5) 2.00 (1.2) 
Experiment 2^ 
Immediate 6.80 (1.4) 4.14 (1.4) -
Delay 6.21 (1.3) 3.10 (1.8) — 
Note. Maximum score = 10. 
dumber of children in each group =16. 
^Number of children is each group =14. 
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Table 2 
Mean Study Time 
Memory Group 
Retention Embedded Rote Incidental 
Interval M SD M SD M SD 
Experiment la 
Immediate 60.00 (20.90) 35.94 (13.07) 33.50 (12.90) 
Delay 70.94 (19.19) 43.12 (16.00) 31.38 (13.30) 
Experiment 
Immediate 58.14 (26.30) 40.00 (13.80) — 
Delay 57.00 (20.72) 39.10 (16.20) — 
Note. Maximum score = 10 
aNumber of children in each group = 16. 
^Number of children in each group = 14. 
\ 
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Table 1 
Experiment 1: Mean Percentage of Strategie Activities 
Memory Group 
Strategic Embedded Rote Incidental 
Activity Immed. Delay Immed. Delay Immed. Delay 
Self Test 9 6 3 3 0 0 
Grouping 17 15 12 15 9 8 
Naming 23 26 17 15 10 12 
Looking 26 29 27 32 32 29 
Counting 3 3 9 6 4 3 
Distracted 21 20 31 28 45 48 
Note. Strategic activity was assessed every 10 seconds and 
summed for the 2 minute study period. Number of children in each 
group = 16. 
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Table 1 
Mean Frequency of Expressed Concern 
Memory Group 
Retention Embedded Rote Incidental 
Interval M SD M SD M SD 
Experiment 1 
Immediate 1 .19 (1.05) 1.25 (1.44) 0.81 (1.11) 
Delay 2 .50 (2.53) 0.88 (1.26) 0.56 (0.73) 
Experiment 2^ 
Immediate 1 .00 (1.18) 1.20 (1.00) — 
Delay 1 .14 (1.17) 0.76 (0.60) -
Note» Presence versus absence of concern about remembering the 
items was assessed every 10 seconds and summed over the 2 minute 
study period; thus maximum concern score = 12. 
Number of children in each group = 16. 
^Number of children in each group =14. 
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Table 1 
Experiment 2: Mean Percentage of Strategic Activities 
Memory Group 
Strategic Embedded Rote 
(. 
Activity Immed. Delay Immed. Delay 
Self Test 10 13 5 3 
Grouping 16 22 9 11 
Naming 28 22 20 23 
Looking 25 18 27 30 
Counting 1 5 5 5 
Distracted 20 20 35 29 
Note. Strategic activity was assessed every 10 seconds and 
summed for the 2 minute study period. Number of children in each 
group =14. 
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